Abstract: eBay provides a large amount of data -enough data to investigate how markets address the problem of asymmetric information. This study analyzes 183 auctions of Apple iPod Touches on eBay.com to find the impact of a seller's rating on price. I found that a seller's percent of negative rating significantly impacts the price they ultimately receive.
I. Introduction
Some markets have the problem of asymmetric information, where one party in the market possesses more information than the other. For example, a seller in the market for used cars typically has more information about the cars for sale than a potential buyer. Some sellers may be honest, but others could be dishonest. The dishonest sellers sometimes drive out the honest sellers leaving only bad cars for sale. Since buyers have imperfect information, both honest and dishonest sellers charge the same price for used cars causing the honest seller to leave the market. Such goods in these failing markets are often called "lemon" goods (Akerlof 1970) .
But a new market can potentially counteract the market failure of "lemon" goods.
Companies such as Carfax.com and Consumer Reports try to alleviate the asymmetric problem by providing information to the consumer for a small fee. What happens if a third party information broker cannot consistently signal the product quality? A potential remedy to this asymmetric information problem is to use past reputation of the seller to help provide a clue as to the current motivation of the seller. Auction websites such as eBay.com provide a modern example of this problem. EBay attempts to alleviate the asymmetric problem by providing a mechanism that allows buyers and sellers to rate each other after transactions.
In order to test the effectiveness of eBay's rating system, I measured the impact a seller's eBay rating has on the price that they receive from an online auction at eBay.com. Using data from eBay auctions of the Apple iPod Touch, I found that a seller's rating has a significant effect on the price that sellers receive. Therefore, I conclude that eBay's rating system is effective in alleviating the problem of asymmetric information in the market.
EBay and other online auction sites act as an auctioneer while the sellers assume most of the responsibility for the quality of their product. Sellers must describe the product and their policies such as shipping costs, acceptable methods of payment, and return policies. Sellers are also responsible for shipping the product. Unlike in most commodity markets, eBay users cannot gather first-hand information about the product before they bid. Buyers rely solely on the seller to describe the item accurately and correctly. Therefore, the buyer assumes the risk of not receiving the item, receiving a damaged item, or receiving an inaccurately described product.
The seller incurs the risk of not receiving payment. Sellers often alleviate this risk by shipping an item only after they receive payment.
Once a seller places an item on sale, any registered eBay user may bid on the item. EBay utilizes a modified ascending-bid, second-price English auction to determine which bid is ultimately successful. This auction type allows bidders to bid up the price of a product until time expires. In a second-price auction, the highest bidder only pays the amount of the second highest bidder. The winning bid must pay the amount of the second highest bid plus one additional bid increment. Bidders see if they are the high bidder but do not see the maximum bids of their opponents 1 .
After a transaction, both the buyer and the seller may leave positive, neutral, or negative feedback and any additional comments that they wish on the eBay website. EBay then compiles a rating for all to see by subtracting the total number of negative feedback from the total number of positive feedback. EBay also offers more complex rating information. Buyers can rate sellers on the following specific aspects of the auction: item as described, communication, shipping time, and shipping and handling charges. EBay also categorizes feedback by time periods into feedback from the last month, the last six months, and the last twelve months. Finally, buyers may also leave any comments about a seller that they wish.
II. Literature Review
When current information on product quality is available at a low cost, expected quality measured by reputation is irrelevant, but information on current quality is often very costly or nonexistent. When information about a product is imperfect and buyers cannot observe quality, individuals often rely on reputation to determine a product's quality. Sellers who invest in reputation receive a price premium above their competitors who do not have a good reputation (Shapiro 1983) .
Consider the article by Landon and Smith (1998) . They used data from Bordeaux wines to estimate the effect of current product quality and reputation on price. Landon and Smith (1998) utilized two separate models to determine price and quality. The quality model included two components -individual firm reputation of quality and collective reputation. Their model for equilibrium price included the current quality of the wine, the expected quality determined by reputation, group qualities, and taste factors. The authors used taste ratings from the Wine Spectator, the world's most circulated wine magazine, to represent current wine quality. The findings of the quality model represented the expected quality in the price equation. The authors also introduced variables that represented the government-determined wine regions of each wine and types of grapes used for each wine. Their findings supported the belief that both current product quality and product reputation play a statistically significant role in determining price, but reputation's impact on price was close to twenty times greater than current quality.
In most markets, reputation is difficult to quantify; this complicates research.
Researchers must be able to quantify reputation in order to use regression models that demonstrate the impact of a seller's reputation on price. Eaton (2008) manually collected the data on the description of each item, the seller's policies, and the seller's reputation. I only considered auctions that ended in a completed sale. I ignored all auctions that did not meet the starting bid or the reserve price and all transactions that ended by eBay's BuyIt-Now Feature 2 . I also left out auctions of iPod touches that excluded ear phones and a USB 2.0 cable or included additional accessories other than the ear phones and cable. IPod Touches that had been "jailbroken" were also left out 3 .
It was important that I collected the data on the next day. EBay keeps the seller's feedback in real-time. If I waited too long after the auctions ended, the data I collected would not reflect the feedback that the bidders saw when they bid on the item. Further, an exogenous 2 EBay has a Buy-It-Now feature that allows sellers to set a price that they are willing to accept right then. Bidders may simply offer the Buy-It-Now price, and the auction ends. Further, some auctions do not end for one of two reasons. Sellers set the starting bid, and they sometimes over value their item and set the starting price too high. Sellers also have an option to set a visible or hidden Reserve Price. If an auction does not reach the set Reserve Price, the seller is not bound to complete the transaction. 3 Jailbroken is a term referring to a hacked iPod that allows users to upload additional applications that Apple has not sanctioned. An iPod loses it warranty when it is "jailbroken." change in trends that might influence the supply or demand for iPod Touches is unlikely to occur in the course of one day.
I chose the Apple iPod Touch for several reasons. The Apple iPod Touch is a popular new item that sees many transactions on eBay ensuring that I will find enough observations. It is important to be able to control for the different characteristics of each iPod Touch being days. Almost half of the auctions accepted payments other than PayPal, and the average number of bids per auctions was close to 24. The percent of negative feedback varied from 0% to 12%, and the mean was 0.89%. Table 1 provides summary statistics of the data collected: 
The Model
Theoretically, eBay's rating system should help buyers determine the integrity of each seller. Buyers may be more willing to bid on products sold by highly rated sellers.
Consequently, sellers with higher overall ratings and fewer negative ratings may receive higher prices for identical products from sellers with lower overall ratings and more negative ratings (Alm and Melnik 2002) . This may not be the case. Lucking-Reiley et al. (2007) found that a seller's rating merely increases the incentive to provide good service. In either case, the rating system should play a valuable role in increasing the integrity of eBay and improve the satisfaction of its buyers and sellers. The rating system helps correct the market failure of imperfect information. Sellers must still compete to keep their customers.
In order to find the impact of a seller's rating, I estimated the following model for Apple iPod Touches using Ordinary Least Squares:
WINPRICE = β1 + β2 NEW + β3 SIXTEENGB + β4 THIRTYTWOGB (1) + Β5 SHIPPING + β6 INSURANCE + β7 WARRANTY + β8 OTHERPAYMENT + β9 NUMOFBIDS + β10 %NEGATIVE + έ
The dependent variable WINPRICE represents the price that the winner of a bid pays to the seller. The highest bidder must pay the amount of the second highest bid plus one bid increment.
The zero-one dummy variables NEW, SIXTEENGB, and THIRTYTWOGB describe the iPod Touch of each auction. A new iPod Touch described as still sealed in the original box receives a one for the variable NEW and zero if the iPod Touch was previously used. A sixteen gigabyte iPod Touch takes on a value of one for the dummy variable SIXTEENGB and a zero for the dummy variable THIRTYTWOGB while a thirty-two gigabyte iPod Touch receives a one for the dummy variable THIRTYTWOGB and a zero for the dummy variable SIXTEENGB. If the iPod Touch has a storage capacity of eight gigabytes, it receives a zero for both SIXTEENGB and THIRTYTWOGB. I expect that new iPod Touches, on average, receive a higher price than used iPod Touches, and the price should increase with increases in the storage capacity.
The variables SHIPPING, INSURANCE, WARRANTY, and OTHERPAYMENT describe the characteristics of each auction that the seller decides. Alm and Melnik (2002) believed that bidders take into account the entire cost of a transaction when deciding on their high bid. Therefore, bidders probably incorporate the shipping costs into their bid decisions.
The variable SHIPPING is the total amount a seller charges for the shipping and handling of a product. Some shipping costs differ by destination. In these cases, I simply used the same zip The variable NUMOFBIDS captures the number of bids an auction has when time expires. The number of bids an auction receives serves as a means to measure the number of people interested in buying the product. As the number of people interested in an auction increases, the willingness to pay of some individuals probably increases as well, giving NUMOFBIDS a positive effect on price.
As I mentioned earlier, papers studying eBay used different measurements for reputation.
Alm and Melnik (2002) Many of the studies highlighted above contained two or more measurements of a seller's reputation, but I believe that this could cause problems such as correlation between the two feedback variables. Further, Lucking-Reiley et al. (2007) hypothesized that a users on eBay believe people are inherently good until they prove otherwise. Sellers start with a clean slate in buyer's minds and are only penalized when they fail to meet a buyer's expectations. This would mean to eBay's feedback mechanism does not allow users to build reputation, but sellers begin with a good reputation until their behavior changes it. Therefore, the feedback mechanism serves as an incentive for sellers to remain honest and provide the best possible ecommerce experience.
My model and data are not without drawbacks. First, I did not include any explanatory variables that described the attractiveness of an item's site. Some sellers are better at web-design and can make their pages more pleasing to the eye and easier to navigate. This would be impossible to quantify and would require that I use my own judgment. I also did not verify the condition of the iPod Touch that the sellers claimed. This should not cause any problems because the feedback mechanism should give sellers an incentive to be honest. Alm and Melnik (2002) pointed out several problems with the use of seller ratings.
First, buyers have little incentive to leave feedback especially if a transaction went smoothly.
Further, bad sellers could potentially change their online identities. EBay recently tried to fix this problem by making it more difficult for sellers to change their identities. EBay now requires them to provide credit card information. Sellers also have incentive to attempt to manipulate their ratings by bidding on their own items or selling low valued goods to build up their rating and then selling a high valued item fraudulently. Finally, honest mistakes sometimes happen. EBay users may respond to comments and feedback, but it then becomes a "he said, she said" situation. Users often cannot determine who is telling the truth.
IV. Results
The regression results appear in Table 2 . Overall, the model was very effective. Five of the nine variables were significant at the 99% confidence level while two of the remaining four variables were significant at the 90% confidence level. The regression had an adjusted R 2 of 0.918704 meaning that the independent variables explain just over 91% of the variability of the winning price around its mean. Using analysis of variance, the model, with a 99% confidence level, rejects the null hypothesis that the explanatory variables have no effect on the winning price and accepts the alternative that the explanatory variables collectively affect winning price significantly. The three variables that described each iPod Touch were all significant at the 99% confidence level and, as expected, had a positive relationship with price. Holding everything else constant, an auction of an iPod Touch that is new and still sealed in the original box (NEW) received, on average, $34.95 more than a used iPod Touch auctioned on eBay. On average, a sixteen gigabyte iPod Touch (SIXTEENGB) had a $64.14 price premium over an eight gigabyte iPod Touch while a thirty-two gigabyte iPod Touch (THIRTYTWOGB) earned a $188.87 more than an a eight gigabyte iPod Touch, ceteris paribus. The number of bids (NUMOFBIDS) was statistically insignificant, but it did have the expected positive relationship with the winning price. I expected the number of bids to significantly increase price. EBay's policies probably impact the significance of this variable.
Sellers decide the starting bid price. Most sellers set the starting bid low to attract more attention, but some sellers set the starting bid high because they want to make sure that their benefits are greater than their costs. The auctions with a low starting bid typically receive many bids while the auctions with a high starting bid receive very few bids even though both end at roughly the same amount. This most likely diminishes the direct impact of the number of bids on the final selling price. bids, and no negative feedback sells for $471.58 on eBay.
V. Conclusion
This paper found that a seller's rating, particularly negative rating, impacts the price they receive on ecommerce auction. Since bidders cannot physically examine items up for auction, they must rely on sellers to provide relevant, accurate information. Sellers may misrepresent an item or fail to deliver an item once payment is received, and buyers have no way of knowing which sellers are dishonest. To combat this asymmetric information problem, online auction sites such as eBay.com developed feedback mechanisms that allow buyers and sellers to rate each other.
I found that negative feedback tends to decrease the price that a seller receives. This is consistent with Lucking-Reiley et al. (2007) who also found that negative feedback decreases the price a seller receives for an item. One possible explanation is that eBay users believe people are inherently good (Lucking-Reiley et al. 2007) . Sellers can only be hurt by their own actions.
This theory does not take away from the value of the feedback mechanism. As long as seller's future benefits outweigh their potential short-run benefits of cheating, the feedback mechanism provides sellers with an incentive to describe their items accurately, provide good service, and to fulfill their obligations.
The rules and laws of ecommerce are changing quickly. According to a recent New York Times article, eBay recently altered the way it displays search results. EBay originally displayed the results in order of when auctions ended, but now sellers with better feedback, lower shipping charges, and lower prices show up first (Stone 2008) . Although eBay's feedback system is not perfect, this study demonstrates the value of buyer feedback in terms of the impact a poor reputation has on selling price. If eBay wanted to take full advantage of its feedback system could introduce an incentive for buyers to record their feedback for every transaction.
Perhaps buyer discounts would increase the frequency with which customers make use of the feedback fields. This would improve the measurement of sellers' reputations and ultimately, improve the quality of both consumers' and sellers' eBay experiences.
